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I. LEAKY PIPELINE: GENDER DISPARITIES AT THE TOP OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 
Despite the fact that women have entered law school in roughly equal 
numbers to men for two decades, gender disparities at the top of the profes-
sion remain. Women make up 19.5% of partners at the largest law firms, 
and 11% of the largest law firms have no women at all on their governing 
committees.' Only 23% of all federal judgeships are held by women, and 
27% of state judgeships are held by women.2 Women constitute 20.6% of 
law school deans and 29.9% of full tenured law professors.3 Gender parity 
has been achieved at the entry point, but not at the top. 
The gender disparities at the top of the legal profession can be de-
scribed as a "leaky pipeline" problem. In 1993, women constituted 50.4% of 
J.D. students.4 In 2011, women made up 47.2% of J.D. students, and they 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and Visiting Professor, 
Harvard Law School. 
I. Catalyst Quick Take: Women in Law in the US., CATALYST (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://catalyst.org/publication/246/women-in-law-in-the-us. 
2. Id 
3. 2008-2009 AALS Statistical Report on Law Faculty, Ass'N AM. L. ScH., 
http://www.aals.org/statistics/2009dlt/titles.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). 
4. AM. BAR Ass'N, FIRST YEAR AND TOTAL J.D. ENROLLMENT BY GENDER 1947-
2010 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal 
_education_ and _admissions_ to_ the_ bar/statistics/jd _enrollment_! yr _ total_gender.authcheck 
dam.pdf. 
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have constituted roughly half in the intervening decades.5 They also made 
up 45.4% of law firm associates and 47.7% of summer associates.6 At the 
same time, only 31.9% of all lawyers are women, and fewer are partners, 
judges, and deans.7 Women are falling out of the pipeline to the positions of 
power. 
A central explanation for the "leaky pipeline" is the impact of mother-
hood on women's working lives, particularly in demanding professions like 
law. Forty-four percent of male lawyers have a spouse who is employed full 
time, whereas 84% of women lawyers do.8 Practically, this means that twice 
as many women lawyers than male lawyers must manage their households 
with a partner who also has a full-time job. Typically, the partner who is not 
employed full-time does more of the household work, becoming the "care-
giver," whereas the one who is employed full-time fulfills the role of 
"breadwinner." If both partners are employed full-time, the breadwin-
ner-caregiver model can no longer operate to fulfill the household's care-
giving needs. The vast majority of women lawyers are not in breadwinner-
caregiver households, which means that the two breadwinners must spend 
more of their time and resources on performing or managing the care giving 
functions. As a result, women are statistically more likely to experience 
work-family conflict, which can adversely affect their advancement in the 
workplace. 
Over the last decade, the "motherhood penalty" in the workplace has 
come to be well documented. In 2003, the New York Times announced the 
"opt-out revolution,'09 suggesting that a significant number of highly educat-
ed women were choosing to quit their careers in order to stay home to raise 
their children full-time. 10 The "opt-out" thesis attempted to explain the de-
cline of women's labor market participation that had begun in 2000. 11 Joan 
Williams countered that women were not opting out of the labor market-
they were being pushed out. 12 Williams suggested that inflexible workplaces 
made professional advancement nearly impossible for working parents of 
young children when such workers did not have a spouse or partner who 
was available full-time to take care of the children and manage the house-
holdY Such workers were usually women. 14 Without access to a full-time 
5. Catalyst Quick Take: Women in Law in the U.S., supra note l. 
6. /d. 
7. /d. 
8. /d. 
9. Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, at 42. 
10. /d. 
11. See generally id. 
12. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND 
CLASS MAlTER 12-41 (2010). 
13. See id. 
14. See id. 
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homemaker, a person cannot be in the labor market full-time unless it is 
possible-financially and psychologically-to outsource all childcare, and 
the workplace is flexible regarding hours and other expectations to accom-
modate the time the worker spends with farnily. 15 
U.S. law does not provide adequate solutions to the "pushed-out" 
problem. On the one hand, federal employment discrimination law now 
prohibits discrimination against mothers, as well as discrimination against 
men with family responsibilities. Under Title VII, an employer cannot treat 
any worker adversely based on stereotypes of traditional gender roles within 
the family. The employer cannot assume that a woman worker will be more 
devoted to caregiving than to work, and therefore unable to fulfill work re-
sponsibilities. 16 The employer cannot discriminate against a male worker 
who does family caregiving on the assumption that only women should be 
doing family caregiving. 17 Courts have recognized both of these patterns of 
conduct as violations of Title VII, as have the EEOC's guidance on caregiv-
er discrimination. 18 
Imposing liability on employers for "family responsibilities discrimi-
nation" is only a limited partial solution to the leaky pipeline problem, 19 
insofar as the problem is understood to result from actual work-family con-
flicts experienced by women in the legal profession, rather than false per-
ceptions and stereotypes by employers. The EEOC's enforcement guidance 
on unlawful disparate treatment of caregivers is telling. The EEOC guidance 
includes thirteen hypothetical examples to illuminate the legal theory of 
caregiver discrimination.20 Of those thirteen examples, only one involves a 
lawyer, and it is the only example the EEOC gives of an "employment deci-
sion lawfully based on actual work performance."21 "Example 6" reads as 
follows: 
After Carla, an associate in a law firm, returned from maternity leave, she began 
missing work frequently because of her difficulty in obtaining childcare and was 
unable to meet several important deadlines. As a result, the firm lost a big client, 
and Carla was given a written warning about her performance. Carla's continued 
childcare difficulties resulted in her missing further deadlines for several important 
15. See generally JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICf AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 40-54,64-94 (2000). 
16. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2009); Back 
v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004). 
17. See, e.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2001). 
18. See Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with 
Caregiving Responsibilities, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html 
(last modified Feb. 8, 2011 ). 
19. I develop this critique in more detail in Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes 
Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 
COLUM. L. REv. I, 54-60 (2010). 
20. See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 18. 
21. /d. 
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projects. Two months after Carla was given the written warning, the firm trans-
ferred her to another department, where she would be excluded from most high-
profile cases but would perform work that has fewer time constraints. Carla filed a 
charge alleging sex discrimination. The investigation revealed that Carla was treat-
ed comparably to other employees, both male and female, who had missed dead-
lines on high-profile projects or otherwise performed unsatisfactorily and had 
failed to improve within a reasonable period of time. Therefore, the employer did 
not violate Title VII by transferring Carla.22 
Once Carla is transferred to another department, she is excluded from high-
profile cases, which means that she is no longer in the pipeline to power. 
It is no secret that, in order to advance to the highest levels in the legal 
profession-whether it is in private practice, judgeships, or legal academ-
ia-the competitive work environment demands at least fifty to sixty hours 
of work per week. Even if a full-time worker has access to "full-time" 
childcare, day care centers are typically open only fifty hours a week (or 
less), 23 and nannies must be paid overtime rates for hours exceeding forty 
(assuming that one has elected to comply with the law).24 Thus, even a 
worker with "full-time" childcare would face barriers to meeting the dead-
lines and requirements of a high-pressure legal job, a prerequisite to ad-
vancement to the positions of power. Workers who successfully meet such 
demands in the workplace are probably not seeing very much of their kids. 
This might explain why 36.1% of mothers with children under the age of six 
are not in the labor force, nor are 44.2% of mothers of infants under one.25 A 
qualitative study published in 2007, based on extensive interviews with 
women who have opted out of full-time work, concludes that the demands 
of the American workplace are incompatible with the time they wish to 
spend with their children.26 At the same time, many mothers report that, had 
it been possible to combine work and family, they would have preferred to 
do so.27 
So it's no surprise that many of the highly visible women in positions 
of power, particularly in the legal profession, are childless. The last three 
women nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court-Elena Kagan, Sonia So-
22. /d. 
23. See Sabrina Tavemise, Day Care Centers Adapt to Round-the-Clock Demand, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2012, at A 12 (noting that day care hours are typically and traditionally 8 
a.m. to 6 p.m. and profiling a few centers that have begun to open at night to accommodate 
nonstandard working time). 
24. Worker Economic Opportunity Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006); Application of 
Minimum Wage and Overtime Provisions, 29 C.F.R. § 552.100 (2012). 
25. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES-
2011, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/famee.pdf. 
26. See PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT? WHY WOMEN REALLY QUIT CAREERS AND 
HEAD HOME 207-37 (2007). 
27. See id. 
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tomayor, and Harriet Miers (who withdrew)-do not have children.28 Janet 
Reno, the first woman attorney general, is childless, as is Janet Napolitano, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security.29 In the business world, a 2010 study 
by economists Marianne Bertrand, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence Katz 
shows that motherhood, rather than sex, accounts for the gender gap be-
tween business school graduates of the University of Chicago classes of 
1990 to 2006.30 The study found that at the outset of their careers, male and 
female MBAs had nearly identical incomes.31 Yet, fifteen years after MBA 
completion, significant disparities emerged. The presence of children was 
the main contributor to the lesser job experience of female MBAs as com-
pared to male MBAs.32 Fifteen years after graduation, women MBAs with 
children have an eight-month deficit in post-MBA work experience com-
pared to men, whereas women MBAs without children have only a one-and-
a-half-month deficit compared to men.33 Similarly, women with children 
work 24% fewer weekly hours than the average male, whereas women 
without children work only 3.3% fewer hours.34 
The leaks in the pipeline are largely attributable to the disproportion-
ate adverse effects of parenthood on women's advancement to positions of 
power. It is more difficult for women to do as much as men because if they 
have children, they are much more likely to be doing more child rearing 
than men with children. When women and men compete for advancement in 
the pipeline to power, it is not surprising that women with children are sig-
nificantly disadvantaged relative to women without children and men with 
children. Many feminist scholars have suggested that, to reduce the gender 
disparity in career advancement, the norms of the workplace must be rede-
fined.35 A fifty- to sixty-plus hour work week would have to cease to be 
regarded as necessary, or even desirable, for those who aspire to become 
law firm partners and Supreme Court justices; and the taking of maternity 
and paternity leave would not only have to be paid, but so widespread that it 
28. David Leonhardt, A Market Punishing to Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at 
Bl. 
29. See id. 
30. See Marianne Bertrand, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Dynamics of the 
Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the Financial and Corporate Sectors, 2 AM. ECON. 
J.: APPLIED ECON. 228, 230 (2010). 
31. Id. at 229. 
32. !d. at 230. 
33. !d. 
34. !d. 
35. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 15; Vicki Schultz & Allison K. Hoffman, The 
Need for a Reduced Workweek in the United States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE 
NEW ECONOMY: THE CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds., 
2006); MAxiNE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA'S 
POLITICAL IDEALS (201 0); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY 
OF DEPENDENCY (2004). 
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ceases to cause disadvantage. Daycare centers and preschools would have to 
be widely available and affordable, and the normal school day would have 
to be longer. Anyone who has been hanging out in the United States lately 
must realize how far-fetched these legal and cultural changes appear. Solv-
ing our pipeline problem this way is a pipe dream. 
At the same time, there is a serious debate about the need to increase 
the numbers of women in positions of power. In Europe, women's represen-
tation in positions of power-in elected legislatures and corporate boards of 
directors-is being increased through legislation imposing gender parity 
quotas. In short, gender quotas requiring equal numbers of men and women 
in the top positions of power are a solution to the leaky pipeline problem. 
Although quotas are politically and legally problematic in the United States, 
the European discourse around gender quotas is worth engaging for its illu-
mination of the link between gender parity in leadership positions and the 
long-term trajectory of work-family reconciliation. The new European poli-
cies and debates can provide fresh insights on the importance of gender 
parity at the top of the legal profession, not only at the doors of entry. 
II. GENDER QUOTAS: AN EMERGING EUROPEAN TREND 
In November 2012, the European Commission proposed a European 
directive requiring publicly traded companies in Europe to achieve gender 
balance on their boards of non-executive directors.36 This proposal follows a 
wave of legislation in various European countries to require publicly traded 
companies to reach a minimum threshold--either 30 or 40o/o--<>f women on 
their boards of directors. The trend began in Norway in 2003. Norway 
passed a law requiring all public companies to achieve gender balance on 
company boards.37 The law provided that each sex must make up at least 
40% of the representatives on company boards, under threat of dissolution 
of the company.38 While Norway was the first country to impose a gender 
quota on corporate boards of directors by law, gender quotas had been im-
plemented in European countries in various contexts. Socialist parties in 
various Western European countries began to adopt gender quotas in the 
36. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Improving the Gender Balance Among Non-executive Directors of Companies 
Listed on Stock Exchanges and Related Measures, at 1-28, COM (2012) 614 final (Nov. 14, 
2012). 
37. Amendment to the Public Limited Companies Act, Ot.prp. nr. 97 (2002-2003) 
(Nor.). 
38. !d. 
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1960s and 1970s. 39 In Sweden, these quotas gained momentum in the 1990s, 
and women now make up half of the Swedish parliament. 40 
In France and Italy, the legislatures over the last three decades have at-
tempted to impose gender quotas for certain elected legislative offices, but 
these electoral gender quotas were struck down by each country's constitu-
tional court.41 In both of these countries, constitutional amendments paved 
the way for new legislation imposing gender quotas for certain elected of-
fices.42 France adopted its gender parity law for elected offices at the munic-
ipal, regional, and national level in 2000.43 In Italy, twelve out of twenty 
regions have adopted gender quotas for regional elections after the constitu-
tional reform of 2003.44 In Spain, a 2007 statute imposed gender quotas on 
39. See MONA LENA KROOK, QUOTAS FOR WOMEN IN POLITICS: GENDER AND 
CANDIDATE SELECTION REFORM WORLDWIDE 107 (2009). 
40. See Lenita Freidenvall, Women's Political Representation and Gender Quotas-
The Swedish Case 3 (Research Program on Gend. Quotas, Working Paper No. 2003:2, 2003). 
41. Loi 82-974 du 19 novembre 1982 modifiant le code electoral et le code des 
communes et relative a !'election des conseillers municipaux et aux conditions d'inscription 
des Frant;:ais etablis hors de France sur les listes electorales [Law 82-974 of November 19, 
1982 modifying the Electoral Code and the Code of Municipalities and Concerning the Elec-
tion of Municipal Councillors and the Registration of Frenchmen Established Outside of 
France on Electoral Lists], JOURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANI;:AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 20, 1982, p. 3487 (statute imposing quotas); Conseil constitu-
tionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 82-146DC, Nov. 18, 1982 (Fr.) (Constitu-
tional court decision striking down quotas); Legge 25 marzo 1993, n. 81 (It.) (statute provid-
ing that neither gender could have a presence of less than 25% on electoral candidate lists in 
municipalities of up to 15,000 inhabitants); Race. uff. corte cost., 6 settembre 1996, n. 
422/199 (It.) (invalidating the candidate quotas). 
42. Loi 99-569 du 8 juillet 1999 relative a l'egalite entre les femmes et les hommes 
[Law 99-569 of July 8, 1999 Relating to Equality Between Women and Men], JOURNAL 
0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANI;:AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 9, 1999, 
p. 10175 (constitutional amendment providing that the law shall promote equal access by 
men and women to elected positions); Legge 18 ottobre 2001, n. 3/2001, in G.U. 2001 (It.) 
(amending Article 117 of the Constitution to require regional laws to suppress any hindrance 
to full equality between men and women in social, cultural, and economic life and parity of 
access to elected office); Legge 30 maggio 2003, n. l/2003, in G.U. 2003 (It.) (adding lan-
guage to Article 117 authorizing the Republic to use special measures to promote equal 
opportunities of men and women). For an extended discussion in English of the French and 
Italian constitutional evolution, see Blanca Rodriguez Ruiz & Ruth Rubio-Marin, The Gen-
der of Representation: On Democracy, Equality, and Parity, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 287, 290-
96 (2008). 
43. Loi 2000-493 du 6 juin 2000 tendant a favoriser l'egal acces des femmes et des 
hommes aux mandats electoraux et fonctions electives [Law 2000-493 of June 6, 2000 Tend-
ing to Favor the Equal Access of Women and Men in Electoral Mandates and Elective Func-
tions], JOURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANI;:AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], June 7, 2000, p. 8560 (favoring the equal access of women and men to electoral 
mandates and elected offices). 
44. See Italy: Quota at the Sub-National Level, QUOTA PROJECT, 
http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=llO (last updated May 
17,2011). 
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both elected office in the legislature, as well as on corporate boards of direc-
tors, which was upheld by the Spanish constitutional court.45 
In 2011, France, Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium followed Norway 
and Spain by adopting laws imposing gender quotas on corporate boards of 
directors.46 While these new statutes only adopt quotas for the boards of 
publicly traded companies, it is clear that in some countries, such as France, 
corporate boards are only the beginning: New laws and decrees will likely 
require gender parity in various domains of political and economic power, 
as required by the 2008 constitutional amendment providing that the law 
shall promote the equal access by men and women to positions of social and 
professional responsibility, as well as to elected office.47 Indeed, in March 
2012, the French legislature passed a statute adopting gender parity on most 
governing committees within the civil service, 48 and many similar laws are 
expected to follow. In this landscape, it would not be surprising if France 
eventually required the judiciary or the governing committees of large law 
firms to achieve gender balance. 
45. L.O.P.J., B.O.E. n. 3/2007, Mar. 22, 2007 (Spain); S.T.C., B.O.E. n. 12/2008, 
Jan. 29, 2008 (Spain). For a discussion of the statute and the decision, see Blanca Rodriguez-
Ruiz & Ruth Rubio-Marin, Constitutional Justification of Parity Democracy, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 1171, 1189(2009). 
46. See Loi 2011-103 du 27 juillet 2011 [Law 2011-103 of July 27, 2011], JOURNAL 
0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANI;AISE [J.O.) [OFFICIAL GAZETIE OF FRANCE), July 27, 
2011, p. 1680; Legge 12 luglio 2011, n. 174, in G.U. (It.); Proposition de loi visant a pro-
mouvoir une representation equilibn5e des femmes et des hommes dans les conseils 
d'administration d'entreprises publiques economiques et de societies qui on fait publique-
ment appel a l'epargne, Senat de Belgique [Proposed legislation to promote balanced repre-
sentation of women and men on boards of directors of public enterprises and economic socie-
ties that we are publicly savings) of Feb. 1, 2011, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.) [Official 
Gazette of Belgium], June 30, 2011, 5-186-2; Act to Amend Book 2 of the Dutch Company 
Act, Stb. 2011, no. 275 (Neth.). See generally EUROPEAN COMM'N, WOMEN IN ECONOMIC 
DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU: PROGRESS REPORT 13 (2012), available at 
http:/ /www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd= 1 &ved=OCCIQFjAA 
&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fjustice%2Fgender-equality%2Ffiles%2Fwomen-
on-boards_en.pdf&ei=h7pbUivQEibVyAGdtYGgAw&usg=AFQjCNEc09oxcT 
N83nBC9 ]ffiJRQm V -FXbQ&sig2=tROmLLAb _ TuogNeSVYvgg&cad=rja. 
47. 2008 CONST. 1 (Fr.); Loi constitutionnelle 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 demo-
dernisation des institutions de Ia Ve Republique (1) [Law 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 on the 
Modernization of the lnstituions of the Fifth Republic), JOURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRAN<;:AISE [J.O.) [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE), July 24, 2008, p. 11890. 
48. Loi 2012-347 du 12 mars 2012 relative a l'acces a l'emploi titulaire et a 
!'amelioration des conditions d'emploi des agents contractuels dans Ia fonction publique, a Ia 
lutte contre les discriminations et portant diverses dispositions relatives a Ia fonction 
publique [Law 2012-347 of March 12, 2012 on Access to Employment and the Improvement 
of Conditions of Employment of Contract Staff in the Public Sector, the Fight Against Dis-
crimination and Containing Various Provisions Relating to the Public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE 
LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE [J.O.) [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE), Mar. 13, 2012, p. 4498. 
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Ill. COMPLETING THE REVOLUTION IN SOCIAL REPRODUCTION 
A wide range of arguments have been advanced to support gender par-
ity quotas. In the context of elections for the legislature, a central claim is 
that the democratic state cannot be legitimate if women do not participate in 
decision making.49 In the corporate boards context, it is often argued that 
women directors are "good for business" because they will improve corpo-
rate governance, which in turn will yield higher profits and shareholder val-
ue. 50 In an earlier article, I have argued that the business case for gender 
parity in corporate leadership is closely linked to the democratic legitimacy 
argument for gender parity in the elected organs of the state. 51 
In the United States, the "business case" for diversity is the proposi-
tion that diversity in a firm (whether gender or race) will enhance the com-
pany's bottom line, measured primarily by shareholder value. 52 In Europe, I 
have argued that the business case for gender parity is not merely-or even 
primarily-a claim that women leaders will increase shareholder value.53 
Rather, owing to political traditions in which corporations are regarded as 
"social partners" of the state, particularly in the adoption and implementa-
tion of industrial and social policy, the power exercised by corporations 
must be legitimized just as state power must be legitimized. 54 Thus, if the 
lack of female representation in the leadership of the state tends to weaken 
the state's democratic legitimacy, such underrepresentation will also harm 
the legitimacy of corporations. Women leaders are "good for business" be-
cause they provide the legitimacy without which a corporation would be 
less effective. 
The justification of quotas from the standpoint of democratic legitima-
cy is different from conceptualizing quotas as equality of opportunity 
measures.55 Democratic legitimacy arguments focus on the state and how its 
governance might be undermined by the absence of women. 56 Equality of 
49. See Drude Dahlerup, Introduction, in WOMEN, QUOTAS AND POLITICS 3, 16-17 
(Drude Dahlerup ed., 2006). 
50. See, e.g., Ami Hole, Government Action to Bring About Gender Balance, 20-
FIRST.COM, http://www.20-first.com/406-0-a-personal-account-of-the-quota-legislation-in-
norway.htrnl (last visited Jan. 8, 2013); see also EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 46, at 7. 
51. Julie C. Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Corpo-
rate Boards, 10 INT'L1. CONST. L. 449 (2012). 
52. See David B. Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity Is 
Good for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the 
Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1548 (2004); Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly 
D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 
431 (2008). 
53. See Suk, supra note 51. 
54. See id. 
55. See Rodriguez Ruiz & Rubio-Marin, supra note 42, at 289. 
56. See id. at 302. 
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opportunity arguments, on the other hand, focus on individuals and how 
their rights might be violated by the persistence of gender disparities.57 In 
France, for example, gender quotas went from being unconstitutional in 
1982 to constitutionally encouraged in 2008 because there was a transfor-
mation in the collective understanding of quotas as democracy measures 
rather than equal opportunity measures.58 In 1982, the proposed quota law 
would only have required women to constitute 25% of the candidates for 
certain municipal elections.59 By contrast, the quotas that were adopted fol-
lowing the 1999 and 2008 constitutional amendments required women to 
constitute half or nearly half of the positions in question.60 
The foundational text of the feminist parity movement, Au Pouvoir, 
Citoyennes!: Liberte, Egalite, Parite ("Towards Power, Female Citizens! 
Liberty, Equality, Parity"), proposed that parity, unlike quotas, would unite, 
rather than divide the democratic republic.61 Parity, unlike quotas, reaf-
firmed the universal aspiration of democracy by ensuring that both parts of 
humanity (male and female) were represented.62 By contrast, quotas-
understood as a low minimum threshold (e.g., 15-25%)--served primarily 
to enhance women's opportunities to compete for desired positions of pow-
er or to make sure their special interests as a group were heard.63 The 25% 
quota treated women as a minority group with interests that may be at odds 
with the rest of the republic; hence it was divisive. On the other hand, "pari-
ty democracy"-understood as fifty-fifty male-female representation in all 
organizations exercising power in a democratic society-is not primarily 
aimed at enhancing women's opportunities as individuals or even as a 
57. See id. at 298. 
58. See id. at 290. 
59. Loi 82-974 du 19 novembre 1982 modifiant le code electoral et le code des 
communes et relative a !'election des conseillers municipaux et aux conditions d'inscription 
des Fran-;:ais etablis hors de France sur les listes electorales [Law 82-974 of November 19, 
1982], JOURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETIE OF 
FRANCE], Nov. 20, 1982, p. 3487 (providing a statute imposing quotas). 
60. Loi 2000-493 du 6 juin 2000 tendant a favoriser !'ega! acces des femmes et des 
hommes aux mandats electoraux et fonctions electives [Law 2000-493 of June 6, 2000 De-
signed to Promote Equal Access of Women and Men in Electoral Mandate and Functions 
Electives], JOURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETIE OF 
FRANCE], June 7, 2000, p. 8560; Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative a Ia representation 
equilibree des femmes et des hommes au sein des conseils d'administration et de surveillance 
et a l'egalite professionnelle [Law 2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on the Balanced Repre-
sentation of Women and Men on Boards of Directors and Supervisory and Professional 
Equality], JOURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANt;AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETIE OF 
FRANCE], Jan. 28,2011, p. 1680. 
61. See FRANCOISE GASPARD, CLAUDE SERVAN-SCHREIBER & ANNE LE GALL, Au 
POUVOIR, CITOYENNES!: LIBERTE, EGALITE, PARITE 166 (1992). 
62. See id. 
63. See id. at 145 (describing 25% as arbitrary). 
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group.64 Its primary purpose is to legitimize the larger institution's exercise 
of political, economic, and social power. The new model embraced gender 
balance as a collective democratic goal rather than as a means of achieving 
equal opportunity for a minority group.65 It also envisioned the fifty-fifty 
gender equilibrium as a permanent feature of any just governing body of the 
state.66 Democratic governance could not claim to be universal or legitimate 
if half of humanity were not represented. 
But what about racial and ethnic quotas? Would the adoption of gen-
der quotas open the floodgates to quotas for minority groups? According to 
the advocates of gender parity, gender parity could not form the basis for 
racial quotas because gender is unlike race or any other demographic cate-
gory. Women have always constituted (roughly) half of humanity and al-
ways will. There were men and women two millennia ago, and there will be 
men and women two millennia from now. It is hard to tell the same story for 
race. On the one hand, this rhetoric sounds like biological sex essentialism. 
The difference between men and women is understood to be "natural,"67 
whereas the difference between blacks and whites is understood to be so-
cially (and legally) constructed. This biological essentialism undergirds the 
traditional justification for the differentiated sex roles of men and women in 
the family and in political and economic affairs. 
At the same time, recognizing the persistence of gender categories 
over time68 need not collapse into biological sex essentialism. It is hard to 
imagine a future without men and women because the differentiation of 
men's and women's social roles has been the central mechanism by which 
societies have made arrangements for social reproduction-the diverse ar-
ray of tasks that must be fulfilled in order for societies to perpetuate them-
selves across generations. Children must be born, educated, and socialized 
to take over the political and economic life of the society. In the modem 
European nation-states, men have been expected to participate as citizens of 
the state, and market-maximizers in civil society. This leaves men with no 
time for the tasks of raising and taking care of the next generation of citi-
zens and market-maximizers. 
The traditional solution to the problem of social reproduction is to as-
sign these tasks to a category of persons-women-who are excluded from 
64. See id. at 137-38 (describing analogies to minority groups). 
65. See generally ELEONORE LEPINARD, L'EGALITE INTROUVABLE: LA PARITE, LES 
FEMINISTES ET LA REPUBLIQUE 158-85 (2007). 
66. GASPARD, SERV AN-SCHREIBER & LE GALL, supra note 61, at 126-30. 
67. See Laure Bereni & Eleonore Lepinard, "Les Femmes Ne Sont Pas Une Catego-
rie ": Les Strategies de Legitimation de Ia Parite en France, 54 REVUE FRAN<;:AISE DE Sci. 
POLITIQUE 71 (2004). 
68. See WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 244-47. 
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political and economic citizenship. Known as the "sexual contract,"69 this 
arrangement ensures social reproduction by creating a class of people who 
are primarily responsible for it and excluded from politics and civil society 
so that they could focus on child rearing. If everybody were included in 
political and economic citizenship, there would be a collective crisis, as 
nobody would be available for the reproductive tasks necessary to ensure 
the existence of the next generation.70 This is why the advent of formal 
equality between men and women, and formal inclusion of women in politi-
cal and economic citizenship, has not rapidly led to equal numbers of men 
and women in the positions of political, social, or economic responsibility. 
The demands of avoiding the extinction of one's people have been too pow-
erful, and have made it hard to disrupt the mechanisms by which social re-
production tasks get allocated to women, despite the formal redefinition of 
women as citizens and market participants. Women ascend to positions of 
political, social, and economic responsibility or leadership by becoming 
"men," persons who spend little or no time on the tasks of social reproduc-
tion. "Men" are either childless or capable of avoiding their social reproduc-
tion functions-by delegating to spouses, family members, nannies, day-
cares, or schools. 
Parity democracy is a strategy for disrupting the assumption that dem-
ocratic citizens are "men."71 I am using the term "men" to include all per-
sons (biologically men and women) who are marginal participants in social 
reproduction. 72 Parity democracy is a social order in which all the positions 
of professional and social responsibility must be filled by (biologically de-
fined) men and women in equal numbers. What happens when this is re-
quired? If all the biological women who are legislators and corporate board 
directors are marginal participants in social reproduction (this is the case 
today), the obvious crisis of social reproduction will then have to be con-
fronted. The biological women in these positions will either not have chil-
dren or will have to delegate social reproduction to others-whether they 
69. See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); see also CAROLE 
PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 33-35 
(1989). 
70. Hegel used this logic to justify women's exclusion from the state and civil socie-
ty. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTSOFTHEPHILOSOPHYOF RlGHT § 166 (Allen Wooded., H.B. 
Nisbet trans., 1991); MICHAEL 0. HARDIMON, HEGEL'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY: THE PROJECT OF 
RECONCILIATION 183-89 (1994). 
71. See SYLVIANE AGACINSKI, PARITY OF THE SEXES 66-68 (Lisa Walsh trans., Co-
lumbia Univ. Press 2001). 
72. Gaspard, Servan-Schreiber & Le Gall argue that two "political" sexes were 
created out of the two "biological" sexes. See GASPARD, SERVAN-SCHREIBER & LE GALL, 
supra note 61, at 62-71. "Political" sex refers to the gendered division of labor by which men 
participate in the public sphere while women inhabit the private sphere of the family, the site 
of social reproduction. See id. 
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are private employees, a market-provided child-care center, or one that is 
state-based. 
It is by no means clear what the world should look like once the sexual 
contract has been dismantled. Is it a world in which marriage is made more 
equal, or one in which it ceases to exist? Will there be there equal numbers 
of male and female breadwinners and equal numbers of male and female 
homemakers? Or will each person, male or female, engage equally in 
breadwinning and homemaking? What the world should look like when the 
sexual contract is dismantled will remain contested for a long time. We 
won't really know when this project has been completed, but we will know 
that it has not been completed if women-the losing parties in the sexual 
contract-have not participated in exercising public power. 
Today, American women constitute roughly 25% or less of the posi-
tions of power in the legal profession, including law firm partners, judges, 
and tenured law professors at top schools.73 In such a universe, the question 
of social reproduction is not confronted by the major institutions because it 
is an unspoken rule that the women who make it to the top of the pipeline 
must be marginal participants in social reproduction. They either do not 
have children or, if they have children, they outsource most of the necessary 
childcare. However, what would happen if biological women had to occupy 
50%, rather than a mere 25%, of all the positions at the top? Would all of 
the women leaders in a parity regime be marginal participants in social re-
production? If so, we would have to accept the fact that the elite men and 
women barely participate in social reproduction. This could mean they ei-
ther do not have children, or they have children who are primarily raised by 
others. 
For better or worse, it is unlikely to be an appealing option for elite 
men and women not to reproduce at all. On the second option-by which 
childcare gets outsourced-gender parity would force a society to think 
hard about how best to do this: Who (if not the mother) raises and educates 
our children for the future of the democratic state and its social and econom-
ic life? What social and institutional arrangements are needed to raise the 
next generation of citizens, in light of the fact that mothers are no longer 
available full-time for this task? Do norms of work have to be reconfigured 
to allow mothers and fathers to become part-time participants in social re-
production? Do taxes, education, immigration, and other institutional ar-
rangements have to be reconfigured to create an affordable, high-quality, 
well-maintained system of nannies and childcare facilities? The reconcilia-
tion of work and family thus becomes a central question for all major social 
institutions, and failure to resolve the crisis of social reproduction will hob-
ble the ability of the state and the market to function efficiently. 
73. See supra Part I. 
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A few recent examples from European politics illustrate this theory. 
European countries recently confronted the fact that individuals in key posi-
tions of state power can get pregnant and give birth. These are two tasks that 
commence the process of social reproduction. In France, the Justice Minis-
ter in 2009, Rachida Dati gave birth during her tenure/4 as did an Italian 
member of the European Parliament, Licia Ronzulli.75 In Spain, Defense 
Minister Carme Chacon became pregnant, gave birth, and even took a few 
weeks of leave to care for the baby in 200876 Under these circumstances, the 
state had to figure out how to govern in light of its leaders' participation in 
the normal processes of social reproduction. The old model said that the 
state did not have to interrupt any functions to make time for social repro-
duction. A man could continue governing even at the moment that he be-
comes a father to a newborn. 77 But suppose a woman of childbearing age is 
now Defense Minister, as was the case in Spain, and she wants to participate 
in social reproduction. The question of whether she should take maternity 
leave-four months in Spain--comes up.78 Does somebody else act as De-
fense Minister during this time? Can national defense proceed normally 
under these circumstances? If so, does our conception of what it means for 
national defense to proceed normally have to change? If not, must she simp-
ly forego the leave, given the importance of her position? 
In France, Justice Minister Rachida Dati did not take any maternity 
leave; she was back at work five days after a C-section.79 That is one answer 
to this question. Licia Ronzulli brought her baby to work and has continued 
to do so into the child's toddler years.8° Carme Chacon just took five weeks 
of maternity leave instead of the four months to which she was entitled.81 
74. See Eleanor Beardsley, Minister Sparks Maternity Leave Debate in France, NPR 
(Jan. 19, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=99456513. 
75. Andrew Rettman, It Was Maternal, Not Political, Says Italian MEP Who Took 
Her Baby to Work, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2010, I :00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/20 1 0/sep/24/licia-ronzulli-baby-parliament. 
76. Victoria Burnett, Spanish Defense Minister Begins Maternity Leave, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/world/europe/20iht-21 madrid. 
13049526.html; Sarah Morris, In Defence of Spain, GUARDIAN (July 3, 2008, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/03/spain.women. 
77. In 2000, when British Prime Minister Tony Blair's son was born, Blair did not 
take paternity leave. See Kenyon Wallace, Will David Cameron's Paternity Leave Change 
Workplace Attitudes?, NAT'L POST (Sept. 1, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://news.nationalpost. 
com/20 1 0/09/0 1 /will-david-cameron%E2%80%99s-paternity-leave-workplace-attitudes. In 
2010, David Cameron became the first Prime Minister to take the two-week paternity leave. 
!d. 
78. Burnett, supra note 76. 
79. See Beardsley, supra note 74. 
80. See Lisa Belkin, Licia Ronzulli, European Parliament Member Takes Her Tod-
dler to Work, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2012, 9:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/20 12/02/18/licia-ronzulli-parliament-with-toddler _ n _1286827 .html. 
81. Morris, supra note 76. 
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Indeed, she split her maternity leave with the child's father, as the new 
Spanish equality law permitted her to do.82 Note these are three different 
solutions to the problem of social reproduction. But it is clear that, if women 
must take up almost half (40% plus), rather than a token minority (15-25%) 
of positions of political, social, and economic power, chances are that some 
of these women at the top are going to engage in social reproduction, by 
getting pregnant and/or by caring for their own children. Thus, the tradition-
al paradigm of male-breadwinner-public sphere participant and female-
caregiver-guardian of private sphere is disrupted. But it can be disrupted in 
many different ways. 
IV. CRITICAL INSIGHTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The politics surrounding President Clinton's nomination of female 
candidates for Attorney General in 1992 is illustrative of the ways in which 
the impetus to reach gender parity in leadership can affect the discourse of 
social reproduction.83 As he assumed the Presidency two decades ago, Clin-
ton was committed to naming a woman as Attorney General, a historical 
first. As is well known, his first two nominations were withdrawn.84 Zoe 
Baird, the first nominee, had hired a nanny, an immigrant whose legal status 
in the United States was in question.85 Baird had not paid the social security 
taxes she owed in connection with the hiring of a nanny.86 In light of this 
"Nannygate" scandal, as it came to be known, Clinton withdrew her nomi-
nationY His second nominee, Judge Kimba Wood, had engaged in similar 
(though legally distinguishable) conduct with regard to childcare.88 Wood, 
too, had hired an undocumented immigrant as a nanny, but she had paid the 
required taxes during a time when the hiring of undocumented aliens was 
not illegal.89 Nonetheless, Clinton withdrew Wood's nomination.90 Ultimate-
ly, the successful nominee was Janet Reno, who was not married and did 
not have children.91 
Might this story have unfolded differently if there had been a rule re-
quiring women to occupy half of all Cabinet positions and/or political ap-
82. !d. 
83. See generally Pat Wingert, Nannygate II: A Women's Backlash? NEWSWEEK, 
Feb. 15, 1993, at 20. 
84. !d. 
85. See Jill Smolowe, The Zoe Baird Debacle: How It Happened, TIME, Feb. I, 
1993, at 31. 
86. Wingert, supra note 83, at 20. 
87. !d. 
88. !d. 
89. !d. 
90. !d. 
91. Leonhardt, supra note 28, at B 1. 
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pointments in the executive branch? Clinton only needed to find one attor-
ney general, but what if he had to appoint seven, fifteen, or fifty women 
with these qualifications? In a recent article in the Atlantic Monthly, law 
professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former Obama State Department director 
of policy planning, has suggested that the only solution to the gender gap 
attributable to work-family conflict is to close the leadership gap, "to elect 
a woman president and 50 women senators; to ensure that women are equal-
ly represented in the ranks of corporate executives and judicial leaders."92 
Slaughter boldly declares: "Only when women wield power in sufficient 
numbers will we create a society that genuinely works for all women. That 
will be a society that works for everyone."93 She suggests that even a world 
that enables women to succeed and constitute 15-30% of the positions of 
power is inadequate to transform society into one that works for everyone.94 
If women had to constitute half of all positions of power (however defined), 
our political and business leaders would not be able to continue to dodge 
collective public-policy solutions to the complex issues raised by "Nanny-
gate": Is it possible for a woman who has children to ascend to positions of 
power? Must she outsource the care of children on the market? Why are so 
many of the available and affordable childcare workers illegal aliens? Do 
our labor and social security laws make it too difficult-both administra-
tively and fmancially-for dual-earner families to employ nannies? Why 
does the state fail to provide early childhood education and nurseries? Why 
is high-quality childcare in day care centers so hard to come by? Why does 
the school day end at 3 p.m., when parents who work full-time work until 5 
or 6 p.m. (or longer)? 
When the successful nominee for Attorney General was a childless 
woman, the "Nannygate" problems shrank in the public conversation. They 
became the private foibles of a few accomplished individual women rather 
than a public problem that the Clinton Administration-and the federal 
government-needed to solve. A few years later, Nannygate reared its head 
again when President George W. Bush nominated Linda Chavez for Secre-
tary ofLabor.95 She was the first Latina woman nominated to a cabinet posi-
tion, but she withdrew after it was revealed that she had housed and given 
money to an illegal immigrant from Guatemala in exchange for domestic 
help.96 After Chavez withdrew, Bush nominated Elaine Chao,97 who became 
92. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can't Have It All, ATLANTIC, Ju-
ly/Aug. 2012, at 85, 89. 
93. /d. 
94. See id. at 89-90. 
95. See Ron Fournier, Chavez Withdraws as Labor Nominee, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 
200 I), http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/200 I 0 I 09/aponline 172303 
_OOO.htm. 
96. See id. 
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the longest serving Secretary of Labor. Although Chao's husband (Senator 
Mitch McConnell) has three children from a previous marriage, Chao is not 
a mother. And the problems raised by Nannygate still remain, without any 
significant coordinated public-policy solutions, and with very little serious 
public debate. 
European countries have more friendly policies toward working moth-
ers, such as paid maternity leaves, special job protections for pregnant 
workers, paid paternity leaves (though not equal to maternity leaves), paid 
childcare leaves, protection of part-time workers, and shorter work weeks.98 
But these policies are not the consequence of gender quotas; they evolved 
and developed since the beginning of the twentieth century, long before 
gender quotas were imagined. Policies allowing women to reconcile work 
with motherhood were largely motivated by pro-natalist politics in various 
European countries.99 In other words, reconciliation of work and family has 
been a pursued not only to achieve gender equality and justice, but as solu-
tion to the problem of social reproduction. In European nations, the last 
century has solidified the recognition that women must contribute to society 
as both mothers and workers in order to optimize the resources of the na-
tion. In short, the survival of modem democratic states and economies de-
pend on women's increasingly varied and complex roles. 
A democratic state cannot perpetuate itself unless its policies deter-
mine the arrangements for social reproduction. It is clear that the old ar-
rangement, the "sexual contract" or the "breadwinner-caregiver model," 
based on a gendered public-private divide, needs to be replaced. Not only is 
this arrangement unjust because it deprives women of the human rewards of 
the public sphere and men the human rewards of caregiving, but as a practi-
cal matter, the old model is dead. Most households are dual-earner house-
holds; those that are not are more likely to be struggling to meet their basic 
needs. 100 The modem economy has evolved in such a way that most families 
with children now require two breadwinners to live a decent life. Yet mod-
em politics and policymaking has not evolved to respond adequately to this 
fact. When women are half of the decision makers, the need for a solution 
97. See David E. Sanger, In a Swift Action, Bush Names Choice for Labor Dept., 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, at AI. 
98. See generally Suk, supra note 19. 
99. See generally KIMBERLY J. MORGAN, WORKING MOTHERS AND THE WELFARE 
STATE: RELIGION AND THE POLITICS OF WORK-FAMILY POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND 
THE UNITED STATES 1-32 (2006). 
100. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: 
WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 7-9 (2003). Elizabeth War-
ren and Amelia Warren Tyagi have found that the "average two-income family earns far 
more today than did the single-breadwinner family of a generation ago;" yet, two-income 
families barely have enough money to spend after "they have paid the mortgage, the car 
payments, the taxes, the health insurance, and the day-care bills." /d. at 8. 
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will become more pressing, and some decent options will become politically 
viable. 
Although it is not currently politically or legally viable in the United 
States today to propose quotas of any sort, the European debates about gen-
der parity can catalyze some critical insights. We need to think more crea-
tively about why and how Americans should approach the underrepresenta-
tion of women in certain domains, particularly at the top of the legal profes-
sion, the subject of this Symposium. Based on the admittedly limited expe-
rience after the implementation of corporate board quotas in Europe, we do 
not know if gender quotas will be sufficient to complete the gender revolu-
tion that feminists are waiting for. Gender quotas will not solve all the prob-
lems ofwomen's inequality in one fell swoop. In Norway, for instance, the 
corporate board quota has rapidly increased the percentage of women on the 
boards of directors of publicly traded companies, the only companies to 
which the law applies. 101 In these companies, 40% of the directors are wom-
en as of 2008. 102 Norway has the highest percentage of women on publicly 
traded company boards. 103 Before the 2003 law was passed, Norway's per-
centage of women on these boards was comparable to that of the United 
States, at 16%. 104 But the percentage of women directors in privately held 
companies (to which the law does not apply) has remained constant at 
around 17%. 105 If the gender quotas only fix gender stratification in the most 
powerful institutions, such as legislatures and corporate boards, they will 
not be sufficient to transform work-family norms for everyone. 
CONCLUSION 
Nonetheless, while gender parity in leadership positions is not suffi-
cient to bring about gender equality in a democratic society, it may be nec-
essary. With gender disparity, the institutions that exercise power and influ-
ence in the democratic state face an undermining of legitimacy, precipitated 
by its inattention to the crisis of social reproduction. Unless women make 
up a significant number of leaders, the problem of social reproduction is not 
101. Norway's Mixed-Gender Boardrooms, EU-NORWAY.ORG, http://www.eu-
norway.org/news/gender_rep_boardrooms (last updated Aug. 6, 2009). 
102. Board Representatives, by Gender, Age Groups, Level of Education, Size 
Groups and Economic Activity, STAT. NOR. (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.ssb.no/styre_en/arkiv/ 
tab-2011-06-07-01-en.html [hereinafter Board Representatives]. 
103. Catalyst Quick Take: Women on Boards, CATALYST (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-boards. 
104. Norway's Mixed-Gender Boardrooms, supra note 101. Note that, in the United 
States, women hold 16.9% of the seats on corporate boards of directors. Catalyst Quick 
Take: Women on Boards, supra note 103. 
105. Board Representatives, supra note 102; Norway's Mixed-Gender Boardrooms, 
supra note 10 I. 
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confronted and not addressed. When women hover at 15-25% of law ftrm 
partners, judges, and elite law professors, the pipeline to power will contin-
ue to leak, with only the most marginal participants in social reproduction 
remaining. Even if the United States never adopts quotas, the European de-
bates around them provide a rich account of why gender parity in decision 
making is an important feature of powerful institutions in a democracy. 

